Quietly Erasing the Great Leader in North Korea

YIKUS Issue Brief No. 170

Kim Myungse (Research Fellow, Yonsei Institute for Unification Studies, Yonsei University)

It's common in most countries for a newly established regime to distinguish itself from its predecessor. This differentiation becomes clear through significant policy shifts when opposition parties take power, but it's minimal when the ruling party is re-elected.

The subtle policy differences observed during re-elections are also present in one-party dictatorships, where structural regime change between parties is impossible. Historically, in typical one-party communist systems, leadership changes often resulted from the demise of the supreme leader rather than power struggles. This was true for the Soviet Communist Party, except during Khrushchev’s time, and also applies to North Korea’s Workers' Party. Additionally, in North Korea, power has been transferred through three generations of father-to-son succession, not through horizontal transfers due to the death of top leaders.

The first declarations from North Korean leaders who inherited power weren’t about differentiating themselves from their predecessors but about 'eternal succession.' The leader who took power after his predecessor's death on July 8, 1994, started his rule with the statement, "Don't expect any change from me." Similarly, the current leader, who inherited power following his predecessor's death on December 17, 2011, also pledged to "thoroughly implement the teachings of the preceding leader."[1] This succession likely signifies a commitment to uphold the ideology, achievements, and traditions of the predecessors, especially the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.

However, in the third generation, a small anomaly appears in this tradition. On September 6, 2024, the North Korean supreme leader visited the O Jin U Artillery Academy. Located in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province, the academy covers a sizable area on a hill, away from civilian homes. The anomaly isn't the visit itself but the change in the school's name. Originally known as the Artillery Military Academy, it was renamed Kim Chol Ju Artillery Military Academy in 1993, after Kim Chol Ju, Kim Il Sung's younger brother. In 1998, it was called Kim Chol Ju Artillery Academy. Then, on November 9, 1999, a statue of Kim Chol Ju was erected at the school, solidifying its recognition as the Kim Chol Ju school.

The reason behind renaming the Artillery Military Academy after Kim Chol Ju in 1993 can be linked to Kim Yong Ju, Kim Il Sung's younger brother and the uncle of Kim Jong Il. Kim Yong Ju was sidelined from the party after the successor's selection in February 1974. He was isolated in Jagang Province from 1976 and only returned to Pyongyang in 1993. It's highly likely that the uncle, who served as Organizing Secretary of the WPK Central Committee and head of the WPK Organization and Guidance Department but was pushed aside by his nephew and kept in the provinces for 17 years, harbored deep resentment. Although he later returned to Pyongyang and was appointed Vice Chairman in an honorary role, the name of his elder brother, Kim Chol Ju, may have been attached to the artillery school to appease his long-standing anger. To appear as a gesture of unity or idolization, the Naval University was also renamed after Kim Jong Suk that same year.

The Artillery Academy, formerly Kim Chol Ju, was renamed O Jin U Artillery Academy during a military parade on April 15, 2017, to honor O Jin U, a former partisan and Minister of the People's Armed Forces. Even more surprising, the Kim Hyong Jik Military Medical University, North Korea's leading military medical school named after Kim Il Sung's father, Kim Hyong Jik, also lost its name and was renamed Rim Chun Chu Military Medical University after Rim Chun Chu, a partisan and former vice president.[2] What's even more surprising is that the Central Cadre School of the Workers' Party of Korea, which the supreme leader visited on October 17, 2022, to give a commemorative lecture—and where he delivered speeches at both its dedication on May 21 and opening on June 1 of this year—was formerly known as 'Kim Il Sung Higher Party School,' named after the chairman. The Kim Il Sung Higher Party School is one of the five major cadre training institutions directly managed by the Workers' Party, along with the University of National Economy (training economic cadres), Kum Song Political University (youth cadres), University of International Relations (diplomatic cadres), and Kang Pan Sok Revolutionary School (female cadres). It’s the highest facility for training North Korea's top party officials. The name disappeared from the institution's title, which had been used for more than 50 years since it was renamed Kim Il Sung Higher Party School in 1972. This isn’t the only institution where the chairman's name has been removed. On April 29, 2021, at the 10th Congress of the Youth League, the organization changed its name from 'Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League' to 'Socialist Patriotic Youth League.'

Removing the names of the so-called 'family lineage' from institutional or organizational names is by no means something that anyone can do. It's a very sensitive issue directly connected to the chairman's so-called 'authority.' The only person who can do it is the supreme leader.

At first glance, one might optimistically think that removing the names of the 'founding father' Kim Il Sung and his family from institutional or organizational names is a groundbreaking and democratic idea to stop the idolization that has long kept people in ignorance. However, a series of measures quickly reveal that such optimism was naive hope.

In 2021, the supreme leader demolished ‘Mansion No. 5' along Potong River, where Kim Il Sung had lived for decades, and built a luxurious residence, completed in April 2022. The 'Mansion No. 5' was where Kim Il Sung resided until his move to Kumsusan Palace in April 1977. The nearby Security Command, responsible for protection, and Ponghwa Clinic, North Korea's leading medical facility, are located there specifically because of the 'Mansion No. 5.' Concerning why this mansion was demolished, the construction site inspection documentary at the time quoted the supreme leader as saying, "It was too shabby for a leader of a country to live in, and the leader would be pleased if luxurious houses were built there and supplied to the people."

However, this contrasts sharply with the idolization propaganda shared with residents. Until recently, the Workers' Party has always depicted the leader as modest. If the 'Mansion No. 5' was truly too shabby for a national leader, what better propaganda tool than that? As the saying goes, seeing is believing; this would be the clearest evidence of the leader's prudence—more powerful than words. Had ‘Mansion No. 5’ been turned into a museum and opened to the public, it could have had a greater impact than the revolutionary museums on Mansudae. No matter how many films or songs about the leader are produced, the message of thriftiness conveyed by one modest Mansion No. 5 can never be replaced. The greatest damage to the party's propaganda would be destroying such a valuable piece of evidence that could instantly reinforce the image of the people’s leader.

During the recent inspection of the O Jin U Artillery Academy, it was confirmed that the statue of Kim Chol Ju, erected at the school in November 1999, had been removed. It's no surprise that his younger brother's statue is gone when Kim Il Sung’s home was completely demolished. Moreover, the names of predecessors are absent from the slogans on the school buildings. Earlier, on April 25, 2024, when Kim Jong Un visited Kim Il Sung Military University and delivered a speech, he stood on a platform with statues to his side. This was different from October 28, 2012, when statues served as the backdrop for the university's 60th-anniversary celebration.

In April 2024, the term 'Day of the Sun' was rarely used in North Korean media, indicating an increasing effort to erase Kim Il Sung's presence. Several reasons may explain this.

Firstly, the more Kim Il Sung's image and name are highlighted, the greater the public's curiosity about Kim Jong Un's relationship with him. This heightens expectations for photos or videos depicting their connection. When such visuals are absent, disappointment and suspicion can grow, creating a significant political challenge since no current images exist of the leader with the 'founding father.' Erasing Kim Il Sung might be a strategic move to avoid this burden.

Secondly, the leader's confidence appears to be rising, driven by achievements such as nuclear development, large-scale greenhouse projects, the construction of 50,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, and the 20x10 Regional Development Policy. This confidence seems to encourage stepping out of Kim Il Sung's shadow, adopting a proactive approach to leadership rather than passively solving past issues, and seeking public support through strong leadership.

Whether this constitutes a genuine breakthrough or a tactic to dodge crisis remains to be seen. The key question is whether residents will believe their living conditions, which have remained unsettled even after 12 years of governance, will improve significantly once the 20x10 Regional Development Policy comes to an end in 10 years. If the vast resources spent over the past decade on military programs, including nuclear and missile development, had been invested in the economy, residents' lives would be vastly better. Alternatively, respecting human rights and fostering democratic development could have reduced external threats, removing the need for nuclear and missile programs.

The core issue is the desire to cling to power, which grants endless privileges. Until this desire is abandoned, living conditions will never improve, regardless of time. Consequently, public suspicion of Kim Il Sung may deepen, culminating in anger and rebellion when people realize they’ve been deceived and are forced to surrender the power they’ve sought to defend.

By Kim Myungse (Research Fellow, Yonsei Institute for Unification Studies, Yonsei University)

● The Issue Brief is written based on the author’s views and has no relation to the official position of the Yonsei University Institute for Unification Studies or North Korean Review.

1. Kim Jong Un. (2011, December 31) "Let us eternally uphold the great General Kim Jong Il and thoroughly implement the General's teachings," Talk with responsible officials of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee.

2. Since the military parade on February 8, 2023, universities and schools previously named after individuals, with the exception of Kim Il Sung Military University, Kim Jong Il University of Military and Politics, and Kim Il Sung Political University, are now referred to as "XXX-named Military University/Officer School." Examples include the Kim Chaek-named Air Force University, Kim Jong Suk-named Naval University, O Jin U-named Artillery General Officer School, and Rim Chun Chu-named Military Medical University. This appears to be an intentional move to strictly differentiate Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il from other individuals, including Kim Jong Suk, thereby showcasing the level of establishment of the monolithic ideological system within the military.