Interview with Anthony V. Rinna -- “The North Korea–Russia Strategic Partnership and Moscow–Washington Great Power Rivalry in a Regional Security Context"

North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia has reshaped the security landscape of Northeast Asia, drawing renewed attention from global analysts and policymakers alike. In his latest article, “The North Korea–Russia Strategic Partnership and Moscow–Washington Great Power Rivalry in a Regional Security Context,” published in the Fall 2025 issue of North Korean Review, Anthony V. Rinna examines how great power competition influences Pyongyang’s evolving ties with Moscow. Following the publication, we spoke with the author about his insights into Russia’s strategic calculations and how the North Korea-Russia partnership may redefine regional stability.

Q: Considering that Russia operates within both European and Asian security frameworks and has long combined both military and economic objectives in Europe—particularly through energy exports—are its interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula solely about security, or are there broader factors at play?

A: Russia most definitely has interests in the economic realm in Korea, although of a very different nature than those of Europe, where energy is weaponized. The issue at play here is that Russia definitely has interests in Korea beyond security, but pursuing those interests is another matter entirely. For years, a great deal of Russian academic and policy research on Korea has focused primarily on economics. Yet even this could be understood in a way as economic security given the fact that North Korea’s importance for Russia economically is in the development of the Russian Far East. This stands in contrast to U.S.-based research, which has heavily skewed toward hard security.

In the past, much of Moscow’s interests toward Korea in the economic realm related to the potential for Korean unification, or at least the mitigation of inter-Korean tensions. Even as Russia was a minor player during the 2018-2019 “Era of Summit Diplomacy”, Russia had a definite interest in Moon Jae-in’s New Northern Policy as a way of shoring up some sort of three-way economic cooperation between Moscow, Pyongyang and Seoul. The Kremlin hopes that maybe North Korea could get sanctions relief to allow for such cooperation, although this would have required Washington’s approval.

At the bilateral level, Russia has long wanted South Korea’s access to advanced technology, while coveting North Korea’s geography for its economic advantages. Moscow made sure that the Rason-Khasan Special Economic Zone and the joint firm Rasonkontrans were exempt from UN sanctions so that Russia could continue using North Korea’s geography for greater access to warm-water ports in the Asia-Pacific.

ROK-Russia ties are very much up in the air at this point, but even now, most Russian researchers seem to be focusing on the economic benefits of current DPRK-Russia ties. The security aspect of the relationship seems to be more of interest to American and South Korean researchers. 

Q: If Russia views North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as indirectly risky—primarily because it could trigger U.S. action—does the current rapprochement aim to increase Moscow’s influence over Pyongyang to prevent a DPRK–U.S. confrontation? And why were similar efforts not made in the 2010s?

A: This may be the case, but based on the opinions of other experts as well as a “reading between the lines”, Russia does not seem to be genuinely afraid of a North Korea-U.S. confrontation. If Russia truly has transferred nuclear submarine technology to the DPRK, and helps the KPA modernize its conventional weaponry, then one can conclude that the Kremlin views conflict between North Korea and the US as something that is not of particular concern. In fact, North Korea may be looking at US fears of a nuclear escalation between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine, and understand that it can still launch conventional attacks without necessarily having to resort to the “nuclear option.”

As for why similar efforts weren’t made in the 2010’s, the simple answer is that Moscow simply didn’t have the agency to do so back then. The Obama administration did make mention of cooperation with Russia over denuclearization, but this was nothing either side seemed to take seriously. At best, it was a way of keeping some communication between Moscow and Washington open after the decline of US-Russia relations in 2014. Likewise, during the first Trump administration, Russia was largely subordinate to China, which took the lead on the “freeze-for-freeze” initiative etc. Even North Korea didn’t particularly value the Kremlin at that time – one need only look at the single, brief summit between Kim Jong Un and Putin during the “Era of Summit Diplomacy” to see that.

Q: Since Russia’s 2012 “turn to the East” initially focused on China but later placed more emphasis on the Korean Peninsula, how—specifically—has Moscow’s stance on Korean security become different from Beijing’s? What are the main ways Russia’s approach varies from China’s?

A: Until recently, Moscow more or less followed China’s lead. The only real daylight between Beijing and Moscow was the latter’s greater reluctance to lay further sanctions against the DPRK in late 2017.

Now, there is an interesting intertwining of how China and Russia approach the DPRK.

Ever since Xi Jinping’s rise, there has been debate about whether China views the DPRK as a strategic asset or a liability. Apparently, there is no lost love between Xi and Kim Jong Un, and even now, experts say that Beijing has been cautious about giving the impression of the formation of a China-North Korea-Russia alliance for fear of upsetting the US. Even so, there is no doubt that China values the DPRK as a strategic asset – this is evident in high-level discourse within the PRC.

Russia likewise seems to be moving toward viewing the DPRK as a strategic asset. Yet the difference is that the Russian Federation, frankly, has a lot less to lose from a conflict on the Korean Peninsula than China. Russia will likely not have to deal with a flood of North Korean refugees the way China would, and the economic damage would likewise be minimal given the Russian Far East’s lack of development (Vladivostok obviously being an exception).

In sum, Russia would benefit from a contingency or even greater instability on the Korean Peninsula insofar as it would distract the US from Europe, and would not lose as much as China.

Q: If renewed U.S.–DPRK talks happen, how could Moscow shape Pyongyang’s position, and which U.S. actions toward the DPRK would best benefit Russia?

A: There’s probably not a whole lot that Russia could do to influence North Korea’s position. There has never been a “Russia responsibility theory”, and the Kremlin does not likely have that kind of economic leverage to induce the DPRK one way or the other.

That said, by far the biggest US action toward Pyongyang that would benefit Russia is relieving US secondary sanctions. The Kremlin has condemned US sanctions and sanctions-related legislation (from the Treasury Department, the White House and Congress) as illegitimate. Perhaps Moscow would offer to curb defense cooperation with the DPRK in exchange for repealing executive orders, OFAC designations and other items targeting North Korea-Russia economic cooperation, although this would likely run into the same problems as UN sanctions, a sort of “You first” type of standoff.

Q: Some time ago, on LinkedIn, you posted the following: “Followers of Korean-language South Korean geopolitical discourse will no doubt know the phrase 안미경중 (America for security, China for economics). Artyom Lukin argues that for North Korea, China will remain the main defense partner. Could we see a similar dynamic happen with the DPRK, a sort of 안러경중?” How would you answer the question you posed?

A: There are many nuances at play here, and a definitive “yes” or “no” is not something I could reasonably give at the moment. Nevertheless, a few things worth considering, which cause me to lean more toward the affirmative:

North Korea may still deeply mistrust Russia after Yeltsin more or less abandoned it in the early 1990s, and thus be unwilling to give Russia excessive leverage over its security. Indeed, South Korea has recently found out how difficult of a balancing act of security ties with the US and economic relations with China are. 

Yet at the same time, the DPRK having its own nuclear deterrent means that it already has a greater degree of security independence, which would allow the DPRK to more confidently pursue a security partnership with Russia based on security assurances and the modernization of its conventional forces. Likewise, as seen with recent developments in Belarus-North Korea relations, Pyongyang, in my opinion, is seeking to position itself as more closely aligned with Russia’s vision for a revised security order in the parts of Eurasia where the Kremlin has the most influence. 

Furthermore, North Korea has a rich history of playing China and Russia off of each other. Yet as I mentioned above, North Korea’s pursuit of deeper ties with Belarus – including Choe Son Hui’s affirmation that North Korea will “respond to all Eurasian security threats” indicates that the DPRK sees its security as being tied with Russia-led shifts in the Eurasian security order. This is different from the way Kim Il Sung pursued ties with countries such as Ceaușescu’s Romania in order to create space for itself between Beijing and Moscow. Yet unless North Korea and Russia truly manage to upgrade the nature of their bilateral trade, China will likely remain Pyongyang’s main economic partner.

*** The views expressed herein belong solely to the interviewee and do not necessarily represent the opinions of NKR or Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies. ***