Our People, The Evil Alliance and The West – Pyongyang’s Antagonistic Calculus

Synopsis

Pyongyang’s destabilizing conduct can be seen as communications with three consistent audiences, namely North Korean citizens, the U.S.-ROK alliance and the West. This could signal why durable rapprochement is extremely difficult.      

Pyongyang’s recent moves to supply Russia with ammunition, artillery systems, ballistic missiles and even combat vehicles, along with the prospective future dispatch of tanks, and 6000 engineering/construction troops, to bolster the previous contingent of more than 10,000 Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers sent in 2024 to reinforce Russia’s war against Ukraine, has been thoroughly analyzed in terms of what the DPRK will receive from Moscow. But while North Korea’s receipt of oil, food and components for weapons manufacturing, air defense systems, satellite and space technology, fighter jets and even aid to enhance its nuclear weapons capabilities, is analytically salient from the perspective of studying the balance of power on the Korean peninsula, it is more politically elucidating to examine the communications supporting Pyongyang’s antagonistic actions through the decades. After all, how the Kim regime justifies its actions is at least as important as their practical impact.

In order to address this issue, this article argues that North Korea's previous actions including military provocations, ballistic missile testing and nuclear device detonation are at least partially underpinned by intentions to communicate different messages to i) the North Korean people, ii) the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and iii) the Western World at large. It also argues that such messaging applies to Pyongyang’s supplies of manpower and materiel to Moscow.

Messages Conveyed through Military Adventurism

In recent years, the DPRK has carried out many actions that have violated international norms. Events which are easily recalled in public memory include the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, a patrol ship of the South Korean Navy in March 2010, numerous missile tests from 2012-2023, and 6 nuclear tests from 2006 to 2017. Based on secondary research, it can be argued that while there are foundational similarities between the messages which are broadcast to North Koreans via the Rodong Sinmun, which is the most widely distributed newspaper in the DPRK, and the communiques issued by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Pyongyang’s informational mouthpiece to the U.S.-ROK alliance and the West at large, there are also differences owing to eventual target audience.       

Concerning the Cheonan sinking, both the domestic and international messaging sought to deny any responsibility for the sinking, accuse the South Koreans of staging a false flag operation by destroying one of their vessels to pin the blame on Pyongyang, issue threats of violence against the U.S.-ROK alliance, and reinforce the narrative that North Korea was the defensive aggrieved party. Specifically, on 28 June 2012, the Rodong Sinmun published an article by Ri Song Ho, stating that the “probability of a torpedo attack on (the) Cheonan Warship” was 0%. To deny culpability, the Rodong Sinmun asserted on 3 April 2018, that “the Cheonan sinking was fabricated by pro-US conservative administrations seeking to incite a standoff between the two Koreas.” and that the South Korean government “would pay dearly for their careless act at a crucial time.” As for counter accusations conveying moral outrage, on 31 March 2010, five days after the sinking, the Rodong Sinmun criticized ongoing ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, threatening that “our military and people’s revenge will strike like lightning to bury our enemies in the sea.” While not addressing the Cheonan sinking, this statement was interpreted as an implicit reference, suggesting the defensive legitimacy of North Korea’s belligerency and framing the U.S.-ROK alliance as aggressors.

Turning to the KCNA, it too denied any culpability with a statement on 20 May 2010 from the North Korean military’s General Staff asserting that North Korea “had nothing to do with the incident.” The agency described South Korea’s accusation of a North Korean torpedo attack as a “sheer fabrication.” On the same day, the KCNA also stated that South Korea orchestrated a “conspiratorial farce” and “charade” to falsely blame North Korea for the sinking, further suggesting that South Korea fabricated evidence, such as torpedo fragments, to escalate tensions and gain international support. As with the Rodong Sinmun, the KCNA backs up national indignation with threats of violence where the Korean People’s Army (KPA) warned that North Korea would respond with “prompt physical strikes” to any South Korean “provocations” in the West Sea, particularly around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) where the Cheonan was sunk. It threatened an “all-out war” if the situation escalated.

However, even as both news outlets tried to preserve Pyongyang’s ethical standing with the North Korean People, and vilify Seoul as deceitful, while issuing deterrent threats to the U.S.-ROK alliance, the KCNA focuses more on information operations against Seoul and/or Washington. On 26 April 2010, it tried to discredit the ROK by reporting that the Cheonan incident occurred in waters where South Korean naval forces were conducting “anti-submarine exercises,” implying that the sinking could have resulted from South Korean or U.S. actions. As for Western directed messaging, the KCNA on 28 May 2010 asserted that the South Korean-led international investigation’s findings (looking into DPRK responsibility for the sinking), were “cooked up” by South Korea and the U.S. as part of a “smear campaign” against the DPRK. It specifically questioned the authenticity of the torpedo propeller presented as evidence, calling it a “fabricated object.” It is worth nothing that the investigative panel involved experts from the U.S., UK, Australia and Sweden, prominent members of the Western World, thereby hinting at the Kim regime’s disdain for the West.

Communications about Missile Testing    

Examining the North’s missile tests from 2012-2023, which contravene UN resolutions, it can be seen that the Rodong Sinmun mainly trumpets such tests as demonstrations of North Korean technological progress or advancements in deterrence against the US. Additionally, most reports claim that the tests were done under Kim Jong-un’s leadership. Therefore, Rodong Sinmun reporting about the DPRK’s missile testing is chiefly meant to bolster national pride and reinforce the Kim regime’s domestic legitimacy. A good example of this is the Rodong Sinmun covering the 29 November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It celebrated the launch as a milestone in North Korea’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The newspaper claimed the missile could strike the entire U.S. mainland, emphasizing Kim Jong Un’s leadership and the nation’s resolve against “U.S. imperialist threats.”

Regarding the KCNA, it also serves as a means for the Kim regime to boast about technological progress or enhanced deterrence, while touting the validity of their leadership. Additionally, reporting about more recent tests, have shown vitriolic language threatening serious harm upon their national enemies (which is the U.S.-ROK alliance), thereby revealing the KCNA to be an important deterrence communicator. Evidence of such language can be seen on 14 April 2023, when the KCNA reported the successful test of the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on 13 April, where it quoted Kim Jong Un saying the missile would “greatly reorganize our strategic deterrence and reinforce effectiveness of our nuclear counterattack,” vowing to strike with “deadly force” until enemies abandoned their “idle strategy”. Additionally, on 24 February 2023, the KCNA reported the test-firing of four Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles. The agency then stated that the missile tests demonstrated “the war posture of the DPRK nuclear combat force bolstering up in every way its deadly nuclear counterattack capability against the hostile forces.” Beyond what the Rodong Sinmun reports, the KCNA appears assigned to transmit virulence against the U.S.-ROK alliance.  

Messaging from Nuclear Device Testing       

As with missile testing the Rodong Sinmum mostly communicates a similar message to North Koreans, concerning the 6 nuclear tests from 2006 to 2017. Essentially, the newspaper stressed technological advancement and/or deterrence enhancement to counter perceived American threats. In almost all Rodong Sinmun reports, the current Kim dictator is given credit for leading nuclear development. Curiously, the 2009 report mentioned defiance against internation sanctions. Holistically taken, the reports can be seen as attempts to rouse nationalist pride, strengthen the “us versus them” mindset amongst the population, and bolster the legitimacy of the Kim regime.

Proof of the above can be seen in reporting about the 9 October 2006 test which the newspaper described as a “historic event” that strengthened the country’s “self-reliant defense capabilities.” The newspaper claimed the test was conducted “with 100% indigenous technology” and was a response to “U.S. military hostility.” For the 25 May 2009 test, the Rodong Sinmum celebrated it’s apparent success and claimed that it was conducted to counter international sanctions and pressure, portraying it as a triumph of local sovereign ideology. As for the rest of the nuclear tests, Kim Jong-un’s leadership was portrayed as indispensable. 

With reference to the KCNA, their press releases reveal that they also express claims to self-defense and the need for deterrence against the US. However, there are added dimensions to their communiques which seek to justify these nuclear tests as i) reactions towards UN sanctions and the collapse of diplomatic negotiations, ii) being environmentally neutral or benign, iii) expressions of hostility towards the U.S. and its allies and iv) demonstrated claims of entry into the Parthenon of nuclear powers.

To support these assertions, it can be seen from the KCNA communique on 25 May 2009 about the second nuclear test that Pyongyang blamed “reckless challenges” from the U.S., particularly following UN sanctions and the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks, for pushing it to conduct the test. Next, when the KCNA announced the third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, it claimed that the test was conducted “in a safe and perfect manner” with no environmental impact, while linking the test to ongoing tensions over UN sanctions. It might be fair to say that the Kim regime was trying to avoid incurring Western wrath over fallout pollution from repeated testing. For the fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016, the KCNA claimed that the DPRK had been elevated to the ranks of advanced nuclear powers, hence demanding entry into the Parthenon of nuclear states. This was an undisguised demand for respect from the West. Referencing the fifth nuclear test on 9 September 2016, the agency stated the test was a response to “hostile forces’ sanctions and pressure”, also repeating the message that there was no radioactive leakage. To some extent, this can be interpreted as an anti-Western message railing against punitive pressure while trying to doge nuclear fallout-based criticism. Lastly, the report covering the sixth nuclear test on 3 September 2017, stressed that it was conducted to counter U.S. and allied “hostile policies”, thereby making the Kim regime’s resistance to U.S. or Western condemnation of its policies abundantly clear. Hence, the KCNA is trying to argue for sovereign legitimacy as a nuclear power, with the repeated moral argument that its nuclear advancements were forced onto it by the hostility of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the sanctions pressure of the West.

Reporting concerning Military Assistance to Russia

Unfortunately, there is no Rodong Sinmun reporting on North Korean war materiel shipments to Russia. Pyongyang’s media dominance and the regime’s practice of avoiding acknowledgment of sensitive international arms transfers, particularly those violating UN sanctions, make it unlikely that the Rodong Sinmun would publicize such activities.

However, in April 2025 it did confirm the deployment of North Korean Troops. Specifically, the Rodong Sinmun published a front-page article praising the “heroic feats” of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces in the Ukraine war, specifically in Russia’s Kursk region. The newspaper highlighted Kim Jong Un’s order to send troops under the June 2024 Russia-North Korea mutual defense treaty, describing their role in helping “liberate” Kursk from Ukrainian forces. It quoted Kim stating that the soldiers “fought for justice” and were “heroes and representatives of the honor of the motherland”. Kim also emphasized their bravery and the “friendship proven by blood” between North Korea and Russia. The Rodong Sinmun was thus trying to convince North Koreans that it was in the DPRK’s national interest to support Russia with the blood of the former’s sons while concurrently drumming up nationalist sentiment.  

Turning to the KCNA, it denies that weapons were sent to Russia. On 22 September 2022, it reported a statement from a North Korean senior official, denying U.S. claims of weapons sales to Russia. The official stated, “We have never exported weapons or ammunition to Russia before and we will not plan to export them,” describing the accusations as a “rumor of arms dealings” spread by the U.S. and other “hostile forces” to tarnish North Korea’s image. The statement urged the U.S. to stop making “reckless remarks” and “keep its mouth shut,” asserting North Korea’s “lawful right” to export and import military equipment despite UN sanctions, which it called “unlawful.”

On 8 November 2022 it published another vehement denial with a statement dismissing U.S. claims that North Korea was covertly shipping artillery shells to Russia as part of a “hostile attempt to tarnish the image of the DPRK in the international arena.” The statement accused the U.S. of invoking “illegal” UN Security Council sanctions to defame North Korea. Lastly, on 23 December 2022, the KCNA reported a statement from the North Korean foreign ministry denying a Japanese media report (from Tokyo Shimbun) that North Korea had shipped munitions to Russia. The spokesperson called the report “the most absurd red herring, which is not worth any comment or interpretation,” and condemned the U.S. for providing lethal weapons to Ukraine, accusing Washington of hypocrisy. The statement did not address specifics of the alleged shipments, focusing on refuting the claims as “groundless.” Comparing the Rodong Sinmun and KCNA, we can see that  they both transmit the same message, with the former practicing “denial by omission” and the latter resisting any accusations of arms transfer, despite messaging posts by Russian soldiers confirming usage of North Korean munitions.

Referencing the dispatch of Korean troops to Russia, the KCNA on 21 October 2024, published a statement from a North Korean UN representative, dismissing reports of North Korean troops in Russia as “groundless stereotyped rumors aimed at smearing the image of North Korea and undermining relations” between North Korea and Russia. Subsequently, Pyongyang’s poker face begam to slip when on 25 October 2024, the KCNA reported a statement from North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong-gyu, who described news about North Korean troops in Russia as “rumors” but added that any potential deployment would be “in accordance with international law.”

Eventually on 28 April 2025, the KCNA reported a statement from the Workers’ Party of Korea, confirming that North Korea had sent troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the Ukraine war, specifically to help “liberate” Russia’s Kursk region. The agency quoted Kim Jong Un, stating the deployment was ordered under the June 2024 mutual defense treaty with Russia to “annihilate and wipe out the Ukrainian neo-Nazi occupiers and liberate the Kursk area in cooperation with the Russian armed forces.” KCNA described the troops as “heroes and representatives of the honor of the motherland,” noting that the operation demonstrated the “highest strategic level of the firm militant friendship” between North Korea and Russia. The statement also referenced “tombstones of the fallen soldiers,” acknowledging casualties which Kim would honor.

Even as the Rodong Sinmun and KCNA seem to be singing from the same proverbial song sheet, there appears to be a greater focus on emphasizing to the international community that Pyongyang is acting within the confines of international law by dispatching troops in according with a pre-existing Moscow-Pyongyang security pact. Furthermore, KCNA’s references to “Ukrainian neo-Nazi occupiers” and “liberate the Kursk area” hint at an attempt to cover the troop deployment with a moral blanket in the eyes of potentially sympathetic states. More worryingly, the claim of the “firm militant friendship” between Pyongyang and Moscow might be an attempt to tell the West that the campaign to isolate North Korea has failed, as the latter now has two patrons (Russia and the PRC) amongst the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Holistically Interpreting North Korean Communications

When North Korean media is analyzed we see different messages transmitted to the 3 distinct audiences. To North Koreans, the reporting reinforces the narrative that Pyeongyang is ethically righteous and that Seoul is morally corrupt. The propaganda also drums up national pride via displays of ostensibly advanced technology while bolstering allegiance to the Kim family via exhortations that their leadership was responsible for such progress. The Rodong Sinmun does what all good authoritarian mouthpieces do by persuading the citizenry to be loyal and sacrifice their sons on foreign battlefields for national interest. Essentially, domestic DPRK media transmits antagonistic “us versus them” ideals within a framework of absolute obedience to authority. While not clearly stated, foreign inference of the Kim regime’s domestic messaging could be that “our people completely believe in his decisions and leadership while accepting any sacrifice demanded of them.” This leads to the deduction, that Pyongyang might hope we will make, that the DPRK has no domestic societal weaknesses. 

Turning to the North’s communique’s addressing the U.S.-ROK alliance or either Washington or Seoul, violent expressions of deterrence are de rigueur. Similarly, information operations against Seoul or Washington are common. For instance, the DPRK’s media implied that the ROKS Cheonan was sunk as a result of friendly fire from U.S. and ROK forces on naval maneuvers. Essentially, Pyeongyang is implacably hostile towards both Washington and Seoul as a default stance, thereby suggesting that rapprochement-based engagement by either the White or Blue House is ill advised, since Kim Jong-un has managed to find an ally in Vladimir Putin, who is prepared to accept the Kim regime for what it is, while the U.S.-ROK alliance expects the North to reform itself.

Regarding messaging towards the West, this is mostly indirect disrespect, beginning with Pyeongyang’s refusal to accept the findings of a Western staffed investigative committee proving North Korean culpability in the Cheonan sinking. Additionally, the North justifies its UN resolution violating actions (like nuclear tests), as being necessary retaliation for Western supported sanctions. Next, the DPRK makes announcements of its fait accompli nuclear tests with the assertion that it must be accepted as a “responsible” nuclear power because it became one on a de facto basis. This is directed at the West because of the 5 UN established nuclear powers, China and Russia express ambivalence about the North’s nuclear status and the U.S. will never accept it, which leaves France and the UK as secondary nuclear states which could in time, quietly acquiesce to North Korean nuclear armed reality. Lastly, the Kim regime attempts to portray responsible statecraft, couching troop deployment to Russia as treaty obligations. This is possibly meant to appeal to non-adversarial global audiences including Pro-Russian right-wing factions in the West who can be convinced that such deployments are justifiable “anti-Nazi” actions. If a deeper inference regarding Kim’s backing for Putin is needed, the Western directed message could be, “We are Russia’s friend. We cannot be isolated by sanctions as we have options beyond China. Also, now that we are destabilizing European and not only Asian security, what are you Europeans going to do about it?”                  

In conclusion, Pyongyang’s domestic media seeks to communicate messages supporting unshakeable national resilience (implying little to no domestic vulnerability), while all DPRK news outlets project unrelenting hostility to the U.S. and ROK (making engagement unproductive). As for other states, the Kim regime is characterized by defiance to the West and demand for respect as a major power (which cannot be granted to a rogue state). Even as its assistance to Russia was done as a real politick quid pro quo as stated at the very beginning of this article, its undeniable involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War as a firm Russian ally is becoming a concrete reality. How the EU, U.S., ROK and other states deal with an intractable and growing North Korean threat is a major foreign policy concern.       

Liang Tuang Nah, PhD is a Research Fellow with the Military Studies Program, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Liang Tuang wishes to thank Colonel Loyd W. Brown, former visiting Research Fellow at RSIS and current senior officer with Headquarters Commandant, United States European Command, for his invaluable intellectual input supporting this article. The views represented here do not represent the official stands of RSIS, NTU, the United States European Command or the U.S. Department of War.   

● The blog post is written based on the author’s opinion and does not represent the official position of the Yonsei University Institute for Unification Studies or North Korean Review.