Nuclear Tunnel Vision: Why Non-Nuclear Threats are the more Clear and Present North Korean Dangers
I. Introduction
The international arena is filled with threats, and North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches dominate foreign policy, media coverage, and academic discourse. In South Korea and the US, the perception of North Korea as the most pressing security threat is largely due to the presence of nuclear weapons.[1] In fact, 83% of Americans regard North Korea's nuclear weapons as a “critical threat” to the country's “vital interest”.[2] However, the USA-ROK alliance's strategic focus on this low-probability threat has created a security dilemma, leading them to overlook or downplay other serious vulnerabilities. Countries must diversify their political tools and approach to addressing North Korean threats.
This blog raises concerns about how this narrow perception of North Korean threats can lead to destabilizing security dilemmas, causing other important issues to be neglected and overshadowed by the focus on nuclear weapons.[3] While it is undeniable that North Korea possesses missiles and nuclear weapons that can cause devastation, the question here is not about the danger of these weapons, but rather the neglect of other threats that can also bring grave consequences. Despite launching 95 missiles in 2022 alone, some of which can reach the US, the focus should not solely be on these weapons.[4] Pyongyang's use of nuclear weapons is low-probability, as consequences and their purpose do not align with North Korea and its leaders’ goals and interests. This blog's preliminary findings are that international actors’ attention should also be given to other vulnerabilities posed by North Korea, such as cyber operations, onward proliferation, and UAV technology, and comprehensive recommendations on how to address these imminent and serious threats.
II. North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not the most immediate threat
It is important to note that while nuclear weapons will always be a catastrophic threat, their offensive use by North Korea is unlikely. Although their arsenal is growing and becoming more robust, with an increased stockpile and fissile materials.[5] This very capability is precisely what locks their nuclear weapons in a defensive posture and final guarantee against external regime change. The 2022 “Law on the DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Weapons” may be presented as an aggressive doctrine, allowing Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons preemptively.[6] To deter this, the ROK and the USA have created a Nuclear Consultative Group as a direct response. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that nuclear weapons are primarily used as a defensive insurance policy, as Pyongyang's main objectives are regime survival, national security, and economic strength. Pyongyang's main intention is regime survival, national security, and economic strength, and using nuclear weapons can jeopardize these goals. [7]
Kim Jong-un “employs threats—including nuclear threats—and possibly limited use of military force to achieve... political objectives” while “maintaining escalation control”.[8] The nuclear arsenal serves as a deterrent shield, allowing the DPRK to conduct coercive actions without fear of a regime-threatening response from the allies. Therefore, the likelihood of North Korea using nuclear weapons for offensive purposes is low, and they are not necessary for their military strategy.[9] What is more, according to Smith, alternative motivations in having nuclear weapons, yet not using them would include: political and diplomatic models to extort and use them as a bargaining chip; catalytic models to catalyze third-party assistance or intervention; assured strategic retaliation to deter regime change attacks and coercion.[10] The only scenario where nuclear weapons may be deployed is in a war-fighting strategy for a second strike, which is unlikely due to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD).[11]
Despite the overwhelming military power of the USA and South Korea compared to North Korea, the perception of North Korean nuclear weapons as the paramount threat persists.[12] They have miscalculated and overplayed the true capabilities and intentions of North Korea, further worsening the situation and “keeping the U.S. and South Korea stuck in a North Korean quagmire.”[13] The most talked-about ICBM, the Hwasong-20, is still undergoing testing and is not a reliable delivery system.[14] Therefore, it is fair to assume that North Korea's main objective is regime survival that further is increased domestic credibility by showcasing the idea of Juche –“we are the strongest and most capable".[15] Yet, some threats that North builds are not in international actors’ radar, alliance is actively defeated and overlooked the three fronts of active and imminent dangers, starting with cyber front.
III. More immediate threats
3.1 Cybersecurity
The DPRK’s strategy goes well beyond acquiring nuclear assets and extends to cyberspace, where the North possesses advanced cyberwarfare capabilities surpassed by only a few nations.[16] While nuclear weapons are well-known and visible, the public and government officials may be unaware of the potential dangers posed by cyber threats.[17] Cybercrime can cause harm without physically invading a country, making it a low-risk and high-return option for the DPRK. [18] So, to the North, keeping the nuclear weapons is extremely costly, while cyber threats mostly bring revenue and do not require the best computers in the world for them to attack successfully. Pyongyang hackers might reach daily attempts of 1.62 million cyberattacks,[19] where hacking happens every day and missiles have not been used once (and likely would not be).[20]
According to John Demers, North Korea has shifted its tactics from guns to keyboards and is now considered one of the world's “leading bank robbers.”[21] So, given the DPRK’s objectives and the current regime and sanctions, actions such as stealing, hacking, and intimidating other nations may be more effective through cyber threats.[22] Cyber attacks are flexible, daily-use tools that can strike globally with little risk to regime survival - a crucial factor for the DPRK to avoid regime-ending retaliation. The Lazarus group (also known as Hidden Cobra), believed to be linked to the North Korean government, is responsible for a range of cyber attacks, including ransomware, phishing, and theft. The victims of their cyberattacks stretch across the globe, from Southeast and South Asia, to Eastern Europe, to South America, and Africa, but with a particular focus on South Korea.[23]
These attacks demonstrate the imminent dangers posed by the DPRK, with notable incidents such as the 2017 theft of 7 million from South Korea, numerous Bitcoin attacks, and the WannaCry ransomware attack on Sony Pictures (also known as the Bangladesh Bank Heist).[24] Another major attack happened in 2021, North Korea stole 1.3 billion in cryptocurrency from financial institutions and companies.[25] And other notable attacks include the 2019 UpBit attack for $41 million, the $275 million theft of KuCoin, the 2022 Ronin attack for $600 million in cryptocurrency, and the 2023 Atomic Wallet attack for $100 million.[26] In 2025, North Korea only strengthened its cyber threats and drove to a record $2 billion in crypto, a 51% “year-over-year increase, making an overall $6.51 billion stolen.[27] Thus, for the money laundering schemes, North Korea has been known as one of the best at laundering crypto.[28]
Besides financial gain, North Korea has also been able to collect high-level officers' messages and calls, with over 40,000 documents.[29] What makes the North even more threatening is their lack of connection to the World Wide Web and their use of Chinese servers to launch attacks, providing them with a strong defense. This asymmetric advantage of isolation serves as a defensive block for their critical infrastructures and populations, which are not connected to the internet like those in the US or South Korea. This makes them immune to cyberattacks, creating a major obstacle for counterattacks. Therefore, cyber warfare and crime pose a significant threat that has already caused harm and is a better fit for the regime's objectives.[30]
3.2.1 US ROK Measures
The majority of cyber attacks from North Korea target the US and South Korea. So, it is important to discuss the cyber resilience measures that South Korea and the US have implemented to retaliate against North Korean cyber attacks. The US has taken action to inform and urge its citizens to protect themselves from the DPRK cyber threats, raising awareness and sharing technical information about North Korean cyber threats under the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.[31] However, these measures did not stop North Korea's cyber attacks. Similarly, despite Seoul's attempt to secure its systems by completely segregating them from the internet, North Korea continued its cyber disruptions.[32] South Korea has released its 2024 National Cybersecurity strategy, which includes new technologies and defense plans for the international community.[33] They have also actively promoted AI-powered technologies and built threat intelligence. Yet, despite the efforts of the alliance that tried to protect themselves and build flexible decision-making processes, both countries did not stop the surge of cyber attacks, but have taken some joint actions.[34] Such as bilateral meetings to identify and take down attacks, impose joint sanctions, and recover assets .[35] And working with Japan to counter DPRK cyber threats to coordinate their capacity.[36]
Nonetheless, these methods heavily rely on bureaucratic processes and diplomatic agreements, which have limited their impact.[37] While communication between parties is important, the main cyber consultations body, the Senior Steering Group, lacks relevant working-level channels and consolidation. [38] There is a need for more than just information sharing; what countries need is responsive guidelines and measures to impose pressure on the North.[39] According to Park S., one response suggestion is to ban cryptocurrencies altogether and create a central bank for digital currency that has been exemplified by the resilient Chinese “CBDC”.[40] However, even with higher traceability, considering the partnership between North Korea and China, where they could abuse the global networks and aid the North's laundering operations, this could make these solutions unpredictable and unreliable.[41] Another recommendation is to formulate a joint cyber deterrence to define terms and methods to really improve understanding of North's strategy and update it as much as they can.[42] Because cyber threats as technologies evolve every day, in turn requiring countries to always be innovative and collaborate, it is important for the government and public to know and invest in cybersecurity to enable peace.[43]
3.2 Onward Proliferation
Selling and transferring nuclear weapons to someone who will exploit and use them is incredibly dangerous and known as onward proliferation. The main threat here is from terrorists, not just from North Korea, and other actors outside of the DPRK. Being fixated on the low probability scenario of North Korea launching a nuclear attack overlooks the higher probability of them selling nuclear materials and blueprints. Their capabilities in reprocessing facilities and extracting plutonium can be useful for such groups that wish to store the fuel. Plutonium oxide, used to produce weapons, is the most imminent threat. It is relatively convenient to ship, with only 6 packs required to produce a bomb.[44]
Even though Pyongyang may have less experience and not the best knowledge and skills to export full nuclear cycles, their expertise in high explosives, testing, tunneling, computational skills, plutonium metallurgy, and fabrication does indeed pose a threat and is marketable.[45] Hence, their abilities are useful to market states and non-state actors with nuclear aspirations; the USA and South Korea may have miscalculated their actions. For instance, the six-party talks did not address these dangerous actions. Indeed, the DPRK has incentives to engage in onward proliferation as it can not only bring monetary benefits but also a chance to seek partners that have money and could effectively help to constrain the USA and ensure regime survival.[46]
But are there any workable actors willing to engage in onward proliferation? According to evidence, yes. The countries that have the highest chance of receiving are Iran or Syria.[47] Iran has all: money, oil, and established collaborations with the DPRK using ballistic missiles, and both could expand their relationship to nuclear capabilities. Both countries have a long history of sales to Iran, such as Scud and Nodong missiles, and have developed into joint development.[48] As for Syria, there has been a narrative that DPRK has helped them in constructing a power-generating research reactor at Al Kibar, as a clone of the Yongbon reactor, later attacked by Israel.[49] What is more, the IAEA in 2008 concluded that Syria and DPRK were “actively involved in plutonium production”.[50] Further evidence of onward proliferation shows that the DPRK used its network to sell blueprints and help Pakistan, Libya, and Syria by assisting in constructing plutonium construction, providing uranium, and enrichment programs.[51] While Iran or Syria are official states and actors, according to Fitzpatrick: “There is grave concern that North Korea’s onward nuclear proliferation could extend to non-state actors”.[52]
And this grave concern has been realized, as Pyongyang's missile technology transfer to Tehran and Damascus in Iran was sent to Hamas and Hezbollah.[53] These two groups are not state actors and are armed militant groups that destabilize the whole Middle East. This weapons supply chain is very complex, with China supporting North Korea, which then supplies to Syria and Iran, who arm non-state groups.[54] This first became public in 2009, and during this year, four confirmed cargo routes were completed.[55] Thus, North Korea has moved from a supplier of complete missile systems to a primary supplier of its parts and materials. States and actors, especially those residing in the Middle East and pursuing nuclear power, may turn to North Korea as a future supplier of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology.[56] Through this proliferation, North Korea makes the largest chunk of illicit money to further support its military advancements.[57] The ROK-USA alliance, rather than focusing on the North's missiles, should change its focus to stopping its spread– such nuclear supply chains can destabilize worldwide systems.
As the proliferation of weapons continues to spread beyond Korea and the USA, the international community must address this issue in various regions. While some countries have implemented multiple layers of defense, these measures have only been temporary solutions. Such precautions have been launched since 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to limit weapons trafficking and UN resolutions (1718,1874) to choke off the supply of the North Korean WMD materials. However, North Korea has adapted to these limitations and uses “denial and deception” techniques to continue exporting and manufacturing weapons.[58] Thus, all current responses suffer similar “bureaucratic inability” as seen in cyber operations. North Korea remains a “no-strings attached” seller of liquid-fueled missile technology, which is relatively easy for less capable states and non-state actors to operate.[59]
Therefore, it is recommended to not only focus on North Korea's nuclear weapons usage, but also target transitioning states or actors. These include countries like Syria and Iran, which have moved from buying systems to acquiring components for domestic production. The alliance and the international actors should promote regional non-proliferation initiatives, with more nuclear-weapon-free zones in volatile regions, and thus reduce the demand-side motivations that drive other states and organizations to seek North Korean assistance in the first place.[60] It is important to address the root problem rather than just the symptoms, and to be more flexible in addressing other vulnerabilities rather than solely focusing on North Korea's nuclear use.
3.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
UAVs, or remotely controlled drones, can fly autonomously without a human pilot and have become a significant threat in the military due to their ability to be used for surveillance, offensive strikes (by carrying explosives), and target acquisition. This poses a kinetic threat to South Korea. While drones are not a new threat, they have shown their power in December 2022, unlike nuclear weapons, which have not been assembled. Recently, North Korea has dispatched five drones across the demilitarized zone into South Korean territory, with one reaching as far as the capital city of Seoul and potentially recording images. These images not only act as cognitive high-level political intent, but also lower public trust in the military[61] because South Korean defense failed to counter the DPRK’s drone operations even though it invested in anti-drone defense capabilities.[62] Due to the significant challenge of North Korea utilizing non-military hardware and small drones, it is difficult for the ROK to identify and distinguish the perpetrator due to radar limitations.[63]
While North Korea has not yet gone into full-scale production, its capabilities have been rapidly advancing with the help of Russia. According to KCNA, they are expected to build serial production systems and go full-scale with Russia's assistance. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un himself has stated that UAVs are “easy to use... components of striking power”.[64] Pyongyang's tactics and hardware are constantly evolving, with Russia’s help to compensate for North Korea's tactical and technological shortcomings.[65] In 2023, North Korea’s strategic UAVs (Satbyol-4 and 9) played a significant role in offsetting Pyongyang's aerial and surveillance inferiority.
While still weaker than the combined joint forces of South Korea and the USA, North Korea has been closing the gap and deficit in terms of asymmetrical forces compared to their conventional forces.[66] The USA has demonstrated the military capability of drones, with the potential for them to be“decisive game changers” in future warfare.[67] If North Korea's drones continue to improve and they are able to build long-range drones, it could be sufficient for them to be inferior to the combined forces of the ROK and the USA.[68] Furthermore, in 2025, the DPRK demonstrated the Geumseong series of UAVs, which may have been developed to carry the AI functions that further modernize communication, surveillance, and threat perception.[69] UAVs significantly boost North’s military power and reshape the future of threats; they are inexpensive, adaptable, and quick. While nuclear weapons are massive and costly to preserve, drones are characterized by swift maneuvers.[70] The 2022 incident was a wake-up call for the USA and Korea to focus on the imminent threat of drones. Conventional attacks and drones are important “modernizing force multipliers” that are needed for both counter-capabilities and defense.[71]
In response, Seoul has been building its own drones to counter North Korea, but still lacks the assets to bring down larger combat drones.[72] Whilst the USA has deployed MQ-9 Reaper drones in Korea to "demonstrate shared commitment” and support alliance priorities in “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance”.[73] These drones are designed to respond to threats, emerging situations, and surveillance on North Korea.[74] On top of that, agreements such as the “September 19 Military Agreement” have been established to prevent clashes, but have been undermined by North Korea. Therefore, South Korea and the USA should move from passive monitoring to a multi-layered defense architecture. For example, current defense systems are two-dimensional and ground-oriented, so Seoul should deploy and focus on speed and automation. Since drones can travel at high speeds and come in various sizes, defense systems should use surveillance and strike capabilities that are automatically linked to respond.[75] To maximize assets, including the new MQ-9 Reaper drones, the alliance must move towards full integration. This could include building a networked system that fuses data from various domains that North Korea could attack (air, space, cyber).[76] Lastly, as with any warfare issue, it is important to address strategic and structural asymmetries for long-term security. This includes strengthening the military agreements and actively participating in the strategies to strengthen cooperation with other powers.[77]
3.4 Additional concerns: Illicit activities
This blog has focused on the three threats from North Korea, but there are numerous other threats that also deserve attention. However, the author believes that Cybersecurity, Onward Proliferation, and UAVs are the main threats and force multipliers in North Korea’s arsenal that require a realignment of the international community’s priorities. These issues are also the most prominent and have growing evidence and warfare tools that align with North Korea's regime and Kim's interests. The additional illicit activities concerned include, but are not limited to: methamphetamine and counterfeit currency trades, which further fuel and enable the regime's development and budget expansion.[78] These two issues are different from most of the country's illegal activities because they are directly sponsored and overseen by the government, specifically through Office 39. A governmental organization that has been managing illegal activities to raise money for the regime since the 1970s.[79]
3.4.1 Methamphetamine Trafficking
One of the main illicit activities is the methamphetamine trade, where North Korea smuggles and exports the highly addictive stimulant powder. This drug is illegal and has high potential for abuse. The drug trade is used to obtain monetary boost to further develop the country's nuclear programs and military gadgets. If countries do not take actions to stop this production, it could potentially close the technological gaps in North Korea's nuclear program.[80] The quality of the meth produced by North Korea is reportedly high, as it is sponsored by a sovereign government.
Starting from the 1990s, North Korea relied on diplomatic immunity to traffic drugs through diplomats, causing difficulties in diplomatic activities.[81] The drug is first smuggled into China and then distributed to other nearby regions, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, through black markets.[82] Nonetheless, the drug trade and “methamphetamine epidemic” have also been prominent inside North Korea since 2004, leading to widespread health issues.[83] Therefore, international aid is needed to address this issue and to encourage cooperation from North Korean health institutions to stop the trade and the consequential hikes in budget and illegal activities.[84]
3.4.2 Counterfeit Currency
Another illicit issue that requires attention is counterfeit currency, also known as supernotes or super dollars. To put it simply, it refers to fake money produced by North Korea, a major money laundering concern. North Korea is known for producing high-quality fake dollars that are circulated in the market.[85] It is also important to note that North counterfeits not only the currency, but also cigarettes, drugs, minerals, and, as mentioned, arms sales. This blog section will focus on currency only. Similar to the drug trade, North Korean diplomats are involved in counterfeiting money and sending it back to the country.[86] In 2016, North Korea was seen working with terrorist groups and criminal organizations to distribute fake bills. Although Pyongyang denies complicity in any currency counterfeiting, there is evidence of North Korean origin in the US Federal Reserve, with an estimated circulation of 15-25 million dollars per year.[87] Office 39, the slush fund that manages illegal activities, is estimated to bring in $500 million to $1 billion annually and acts as a catalyst for the regime's nuclear plans. This fund is partly responsible for developing the Yongbyon nuclear facility.[88]
On top of warfare capacity funding, economically, North Korea has also sabotaged and undermined confidence in the US dollar, causing fluctuations in places like Taiwan.[89] It is important to broaden the focus beyond nuclear threats and consider the impact of these illicit activities. It is crucial to broaden policies and address these threats and illegal activities. As they continue to grow, North Korea will have more resources and new ways to achieve its regime goals and undermine the international community.
IV. Conclusion
There is a need for the U.S.-South Korea alliance to have a more flexible and broadened response that includes a wider range of activities. Overall, the alliance would greatly benefit from a more diverse set of policy tools that focus on deterrence by denial.[90] This shift would result in fewer provocations and increased security, ultimately minimizing acts of aggression. However, it is important to note that the U.S. and South Korea have been working together to build a shared security system and organizations to counter potential attacks from North Korea. This alliance is evident through various agreements, such as the Mutual Defense Treaty (US-ROK), NPT (US-ROK), Defense Cost Agreement 2024 (US-ROK), SOFA (US-ROK), SMA(US-ROK), GSOMIA (JP-ROK-USA), and, of course, NCG for the USA’s nuclear umbrella. Despite this, South Korea has expressed concerns about the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S.'s extended nuclear deterrence and would prefer to strengthen its own abilities.[91] One way to address this insecurity is to back the promises and threats with “adequate military capabilities.” [92]
Currently, the U.S.'s nuclear umbrella relies on promises of strategic forces that are primarily deployed far from the Korean peninsula.[93] Some of the options can be attributed to an enhanced status quo for extended deterrence and reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, the alliance can also focus on other issues, as the strategy for addressing them has not been as sustained as it has been for nuclear issues. It is important for countries to have comprehensive approaches that include diplomatic goals beyond just denuclearization. The US-ROK alliance needs to develop its flexible response to include other matters, too. For South Korea not to become over reliant on Washington, both countries need to start working together in areas such as: military, civilian agencies and private industries to better understand North Korean capabilities and intentions.[94] This should be supported by diplomacy and realistic goals that do not include immediate denuclearization of North Korea.
All in all, the three issues, such as cyber attacks, onward proliferation, and UAVs, need to be on countries’ radar, which they need to allocate with their resources and planning. Cyber issues are rapidly evolving, and with the growth of AI, North Korea may use them to develop their state-level military operations even more. Onward proliferation is an immediate peril, not just a separate regional issue. UAVs also require better preparations and development from the US-ROK. The alliance’s joint exercises and strategic and diplomatic doctrine must reflect those growing issues and reshape their programs to “emphasize the defensive functions.” These force multipliers can contribute to mass cyber attacks, financial disruptions, and drones that can impact infrastructure. The alliance's posture should include a comprehensive response to these issues, rather than primarily focusing on nuclear issues and being stuck in the low-probability nuclear attack.
****The Views herein do not necessarily represent those of NKR, Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies, or Yonsei University*****
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Roh Suk-jo. “North Korea Unveils AI-Enhanced Kamikaze Drones Without Pixelation.” 2025. The Chosun Daily. September 20, 2025. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/20/GGEEISSGI5AYJCYP6ZULRLWJG4/.
Ryall, Julian. 2017. “North Korea ‘ramps up Manufacture of Illegal Drugs.’” Dw.Com, August 21, 2017. https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-ramps-up-manufacture-of-illegal-drugs-amid-sanctions/a-40169753.
Seo, Kang-Il, Jong-Hoon Kim, Man-Hee Won, Dong-Min Lee, Jae-Hyung Bae, and Sang-Hyuk Park. “Case Study on the Trends of North Korean Strategic UAV ‘Satbyol.’” International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology 11, no. 4 (December 31, 2023): 317–21. doi:10.17703/IJACT.2023.11.4.317.
Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou. “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran | Arms Control Association.” n.d. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/iran-nuclear-briefs/dangerous-dealings-north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-threat
Slavney, Natalia. 2023. “Is South Korea Going Nuclear? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North. February 3, 2023. https://www.38north.org/2023/02/is-south-korea-going-nuclear/.
SMITH, SHANE. “North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy.” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11153.
Team, Chainalysis. 2026. “North Korea Drives Record $2 Billion Crypto Theft Year, Pushing All-Time Total to $6.75 Billion.” Chainalysis. January 5, 2026. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-hacking-stolen-funds-2026/.
“Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme To.” 2025. February 6, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and?ref=thestack.technology.
Tidy, Joe. 2025. “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions From $1.5bn ByBit Hack.” March 10, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.
Unconfirmed evidence with Myanmar cooperation and nuclear connection also exists, but has long cut ties with North Korea to normalize relations with the West. https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n14_19102012.pdf
US Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. 2021. “Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe.” Press release. February 7, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and.
U.S. DEP'T JUST. ET AL., DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY: GUIDANCE ON THE NORTH KOREAN CYBER THREAT 2 (Apr. 15, 2020) [hereinafter DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY].
Vann H. Van Diepen. 2025. “Future Missile/Space Developments Presaged; WMD Possession Underscored - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North. October 15, 2025. https://www.38north.org/2025/10/future-missile-space-developments-presaged-wmd-possession-underscored/.
Yatskievych, Michael, "North Korean supernotes: Nuclear arms financed by counterfeit currency" (2014). ETD Collection for University of Texas, El Paso. AAI1557808. https://scholarworks.utep.edu/dissertations/AAI1557808
“2025 Military Strength Ranking.” n.d. Www.GlobalFirepower.Com. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php#google_vignette.
백남설. "An Analysis of DRUG Manufacturing in North Korea and Smuggling in South Korea" International Journal of Terrorism & National Security 6, no.2 (2021) : 19-25.
정구연. "South Korean Public's Threat Perception of North Korea and Support for the US Extended Deterrence" Korea Observer 55, no.1 (2024) : 53-72.doi: 10.29152/KOIKS.2024.55.1.53
[1]정구연. "South Korean Public's Threat Perception of North Korea and Support for the US Extended Deterrence" Korea Observer 55, no.1 (2024) : 53-72.doi: 10.29152/KOIKS.2024.55.1.53
[2] JeffreyM. Jones, In U.S., 83% Say North Korean Nukes Are a Critical Threat," Gallup Politics, February 2013.
[3]Park, James, and Mike Mochizuki. 2024. “The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. May 9, 2024. https://quincyinst.org/research/the-u-s-japan-south-korea-trilateral-partnership-pursuing-regional-stability-and-avoiding-military-escalation/.
[4]정구연. "South Korean Public's Threat Perception of North Korea and Support for the US Extended Deterrence" Korea Observer 55, no.1 (2024) : 53-72.doi: 10.29152/KOIKS.2024.55.1.53
[5] SMITH, SHANE. “North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy.” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11153.
[6]Slavney, Natalia. 2023. “Is South Korea Going Nuclear? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North. February 3, 2023. https://www.38north.org/2023/02/is-south-korea-going-nuclear/.
[7] John Delury and Chung-in Moon. North. 2017. “Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire.” 38 North. February 23, 2017. https://www.38north.org/2011/04/quagmire/.
[8]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. 2023. “North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030.” NIE 2023-00262-B. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-NIE-North-Korea-Scenarios-For-Leveraging-Nuclear-Weapons-June2023.pdf.
[9]Ibid.
[10] SMITH, SHANE. “North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy.” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11153.
[11]Ibid.
[12] According to the global firepower South Korea is in 5th place among 145 countries, being just below 4 most biggest and powerful countries (USA,Russia, China, India). Whereas North Korea placed 34th place, thus it is safe to say that the alliance of South Korea and USA is much stronger. Whereas North Korea placed 34th place, thus it is safe to say that the alliance of South Korea and USA power is higher. From “2025 Military Strength Ranking.” n.d. Www.GlobalFirepower.Com. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php#google_vignette.
[13]Delury, John, and Chung-In Moon. 2017. “Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire.” 38 North. February 23, 2017. https://www.38north.org/2011/04/quagmire/.
[14]Vann H. Van Diepen. 2025. “Future Missile/Space Developments Presaged; WMD Possession Underscored - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North. October 15, 2025. https://www.38north.org/2025/10/future-missile-space-developments-presaged-wmd-possession-underscored/.
[15]Bennett, Bruce W., Kang Choi, Myong-Hyun Go, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Jiyoung Park, Bruce Klingner, and Du-Hyeong Cha, Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html.
[16] Park, Seongjun. "Evading, Hacking & Laundering for Nukes: North Korea's Financial Cybercrimes & the Missing Silver Bullet for Countering Them." Fordham International Law Journal 45, no. 4 (2022): 675-716. HeinOnline.
[17] A total of 6 tests have been done from 2006 to 2017
[18]“MARK FITZPATRICK. THE WORRISOME STATE:ASSESSING NORTH KOREA’SSECURITY CHALLENGES.” 2012. CERI STRATEGY PAPERS N° 14 – Rencontre Stratégique (October). https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n14_19102012.pdf.
[19]Deng, Yihan. 2024. “Digital Warfare on the Korean Peninsular | GJIA.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. July 10, 2024. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/10/ai-and-cybersecurity-in-digital-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula/.
[20]Larsen, Morten Soendergaard. 2021. “While North Korean Missiles Sit in Storage, Their Hackers Go Rampant.” Foreign Policy, March 15, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/.
[21]US Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. 2021. “Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe.” Press release. February 7, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and.
[22]“Daniel Russel. North Korea’s Next Weapon of Choice: Cyber Nuclear weapons aren’t the only tool in Pyongyang’s arsenal.” 2019. Asia Society Policy Institute. April 2019. https://asiasociety.org/magazine/article/north-koreas-next-weapon-choice-cyber.
[23]Ibid.
[24] Worldwide cyberattack, that targeted Microsoft running computers and demanding ransom payments in the form of Bitcoin.
[25]“Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme To.” 2025. February 6, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and?ref=thestack.technology .
[26] Tidy, Joe. 2025. “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions From $1.5bn ByBit Hack.” March 10, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.
[27] Team, Chainalysis. 2026. “North Korea Drives Record $2 Billion Crypto Theft Year, Pushing All-Time Total to $6.75 Billion.” Chainalysis. January 5, 2026. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-hacking-stolen-funds-2026/.
[28] Tidy, Joe. 2025. “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions From $1.5bn ByBit Hack.” March 10, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.
[29]“Daniel Russel. North Korea’s Next Weapon of Choice: Cyber Nuclear weapons aren’t the only tool in Pyongyang’s arsenal.” 2019. Asia Society Policy Institute. April 2019. https://asiasociety.org/magazine/article/north-koreas-next-weapon-choice-cyber.
[30]Ibid.
[31] U.S. DEP'T JUST. ET AL., DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY: GUIDANCE ON THE NORTH KOREAN CYBER THREAT 2 (Apr. 15, 2020) [hereinafter DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY].
[32] Park, Seongjun. "Evading, Hacking & Laundering for Nukes: North Korea's Financial Cybercrimes & the Missing Silver Bullet for Countering Them." Fordham International Law Journal 45, no. 4 (2022): 675-716. HeinOnline.
[33]Deng, Yihan. 2024. “Digital Warfare on the Korean Peninsular | GJIA.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. July 10, 2024. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/10/ai-and-cybersecurity-in-digital-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula/.
[34] Park, Seongjun. "Evading, Hacking & Laundering for Nukes: North Korea's Financial Cybercrimes & the Missing Silver Bullet for Countering Them." Fordham International Law Journal 45, no. 4 (2022): 675-716. HeinOnline.
[35]Bae, Sunha. 2025. “Deterrence Under Pressure: Sustaining U.S.–ROK Cyber Cooperation Against North Korea.” CSIS, April 2, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterrence-under-pressure-sustaining-us-rok-cyber-cooperation-against-north-korea.
[36]Inaugural United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilate;al Diplomatic Working Group Meeting on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Cyber Activities, Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, US department of state https://2021-2025.state.gov/inaugural-united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-diplomatic-working-group-meeting-on-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-cyber-activities/
[37]Bae, Sunha. 2025. “Deterrence Under Pressure: Sustaining U.S.–ROK Cyber Cooperation Against North Korea.” CSIS, April 2, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterrence-under-pressure-sustaining-us-rok-cyber-cooperation-against-north-korea.
[38]Ibid.
[39]Ibid.
[40] Park, Seongjun. "Evading, Hacking & Laundering for Nukes: North Korea's Financial Cybercrimes & the Missing Silver Bullet for Countering Them." Fordham International Law Journal 45, no. 4 (2022): 675-716. HeinOnline.
[41]Ibid.
[42]James E. Platte. Defending Forward on the Korean Peninsula: Cyber Deterrence in the U.S.-ROK Alliance.” 2020. Cyber Defense Review Volume 5, Number 1: 75–92. https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/CDR%20V5N1%20-%2006_Platte_WEB.pdf.
[43]Deng, Yihan. 2024. “Digital Warfare on the Korean Peninsular | GJIA.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. July 10, 2024. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/10/ai-and-cybersecurity-in-digital-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula/.
[44] Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou. “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran | Arms Control Association.” n.d. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/iran-nuclear-briefs/dangerous-dealings-north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-threat
[45] Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou. “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran | Arms Control Association.” n.d. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/iran-nuclear-briefs/dangerous-dealings-north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-and-threat
[46]Ibid.
[47]Ibid.
[48]“Pual Kerr. Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation | Arms Control Association.” n.d. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-01/iran-nuclear-briefs/iran-north-korea-deepen-missile-cooperation.
[49]Yatskievych, Michael. "North Korean Supernotes: Nuclear Arms Financed By Counterfeit Currency." Master's thesis, University of Texas at El Paso, 2014.https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/al-kibar-nuclear/.
[50] Joseph Fitsanakis, "Western Intelligence Points to New Syrian Nuclear Plant: Report," IntelNews, January 15,2015.
[51] Unconfirmed evidence with Myanmar cooperation and nuclear connection also exists, but has long cut ties with North Korea to normalize relations with the West. “MARK FITZPATRICK. THE WORRISOME STATE:ASSESSING NORTH KOREA’SSECURITY CHALLENGES.” 2012. CERI STRATEGY PAPERS N° 14 – Rencontre Stratégique (October). https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n14_19102012.pdf.
[52]Ibid.
[53]Iverson, Shepherd. “China’s Nuclear-Armed Proxy—North Korea: Hostile Surrogacies and Rational Security Adjustments.” North Korean Review 12, no. 1 (2016): 66–81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44525736
[54]Ibid.
[55]Ibid.
[56] Pollack, Joshua. 2011. “BALLISTIC TRAJECTORY: The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market.” The Nonproliferation Review 18 (2): 411–29. doi:10.1080/10736700.2011.583120.
[57] Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. "North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma." Cornell International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2018): 57-100. HeinOnline.
[58] Pollack, Joshua. 2011. “BALLISTIC TRAJECTORY: The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market.” The Nonproliferation Review 18 (2): 411–29. doi:10.1080/10736700.2011.583120.
[59]Ibid.
[60] Eyina, Nkatomba. (2024). DETERRENCE, SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF NORTH KOREA AND PAKISTAN. 5. 97-108.
[61] Kim, Min-Hyuk. “A Study on the Militarization of Artificial Intelligence Technology in North Korea and the Development Direction of Corresponding Weapon System in South Korea.” Journal of Information Technology Services 20, no. 1 (February 28, 2021): 29–40. doi:10.9716/KITS.2021.20.1.029.
[62] Hyung-Jin Kim,“South Korea Military Apologizes for Failing to Shoot Down North’s Drones.” 2022. PBS News. December 27, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-korea-mcanilitary-apologizes-for-failing-to-shoot-down-norths-drones.
[63] Kim, Min-Hyuk. “A Study on the Militarization of Artificial Intelligence Technology in North Korea and the Development Direction of Corresponding Weapon System in South Korea.” Journal of Information Technology Services 20, no. 1 (February 28, 2021): 29–40. doi:10.9716/KITS.2021.20.1.029.
[64]News Wires. 2024. “North Korea Orders 'Mass Production’ of Attack Drones, Raising Concerns Over Russia Alliance.” France 24. November 15, 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20241115-north-korea-drones.
[65]Corrado, Jonathan, Chelsie Alexandre, and Anton Ponomarenko. 2025. “North Korea’s Deadly Drone Bonanza Is Coming to a Peninsula Near You.” War on the Rocks. August 25, 2025. https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/north-koreas-deadly-drone-bonanza-is-coming-to-a-peninsula-near-you/.
[66] Seo, Kang-Il, Jong-Hoon Kim, Man-Hee Won, Dong-Min Lee, Jae-Hyung Bae, and Sang-Hyuk Park. “Case Study on the Trends of North Korean Strategic UAV ‘Satbyol.’” International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology 11, no. 4 (December 31, 2023): 317–21. doi:10.17703/IJACT.2023.11.4.317.
[67]Ibid.
[68]Ibid.
[69] Roh Suk-jo. “North Korea Unveils AI-Enhanced Kamikaze Drones Without Pixelation.” 2025. The Chosun Daily. September 20, 2025. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/09/20/GGEEISSGI5AYJCYP6ZULRLWJG4/.
[70]Corrado, Jonathan, Chelsie Alexandre, and Anton Ponomarenko. 2025. “North Korea’s Deadly Drone Bonanza Is Coming to a Peninsula Near You.” War on the Rocks. August 25, 2025. https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/north-koreas-deadly-drone-bonanza-is-coming-to-a-peninsula-near-you/.
[71]Ibid.
[72] Hyung-Jin Kim,“South Korea Military Apologizes for Failing to Shoot Down North’s Drones.” 2022. PBS News. December 27, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-korea-military-apologizes-for-failing-to-shoot-down-norths-drones.
[73] Korea JoongAng Daily. 2025. “U.S. Confirms Deployment of MQ-9 Reaper Drones in Korea.” September 29, 2025. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-29/national/defense/US-confirms-deployment-of-MQ9-Reaper-drones-in-S-Korea/2410794.
[74]Ibid.
[75] International Journal of Military Affairs,2019 4(2), 2-20-7 Arakawa Arakawaku Tokyo Japan, ISSN 2423-8775. https://j-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/International-Journal-of-Military-Affairs_201942.pdf
[76] Edmonston, M. and Air University (U.S.). Press 2022, T he Impact of RPA Technology on Conventional Deterrence Against North Korea,Maxwell paper,Air University Press https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/MP_075_Edmonston_The_Impact_of_RPA_Technology.pdf
[77] International Journal of Military Affairs,2019 4(2), 2-20-7 Arakawa Arakawaku Tokyo Japan, ISSN 2423-8775. https://j-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/International-Journal-of-Military-Affairs_201942.pdf
[78] Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. "North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma." Cornell International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2018): 57-100. HeinOnline.
[79]Ibid.
[80]Ryall, Julian. 2017. “North Korea ‘ramps up Manufacture of Illegal Drugs.’” Dw.Com, August 21, 2017. https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-ramps-up-manufacture-of-illegal-drugs-amid-sanctions/a-40169753.
[81] 백남설. "An Analysis of DRUG Manufacturing in North Korea and Smuggling in South Korea" International Journal of Terrorism & National Security 6, no.2 (2021) : 19-25.
[82] Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. "North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma." Cornell International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2018): 57-100. HeinOnline.
[83] Lankov, Andrei, and Seok-hyang Kim. “A New Face of North Korean Drug Use: Upsurge in Methamphetamine Abuse Across the Northern Areas of North Korea.” North Korean Review 9, no. 1 (2013): 45–60. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908906.
[84]Ibid.
[85] Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. "North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma." Cornell International Law Journal 51, no. 1 (2018): 57-100. HeinOnline.
[86]Ibid.
[87] L, Aaron. 2023. “Financial Sanctions & North Korea: In Search of the Evidence of Currency Counterfeiting & Money Laundering Part II.” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. November 3, 2023. https://apjjf.org/john-mcglynn/2463/article.
[88] Yatskievych, Michael, "North Korean supernotes: Nuclear arms financed by counterfeit currency" (2014). ETD Collection for University of Texas, El Paso. AAI1557808. https://scholarworks.utep.edu/dissertations/AAI1557808
[89]Ibid.
[90]Park, James. 2025. “From Punishment to Denial: Stabilizing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. May 20, 2025. https://quincyinst.org/research/from-punishment-to-denial-stabilizing-deterrence-on-the-korean-peninsula/#
[91] Kuyoun Chung. 2024. “South Korean Public’s Threat Perception of North Korea and Support for the US Extended Deterrence.” Korea Observer - Institute of Korean Studies 55 (1): 53–72. https://doi.org/10.29152/koiks.2024.55.1.53.
[92] Lind, Jennifer, and Daryl G. Press. 2025. “US-South Korea Nuclear Sharing: A Middle Path to Increase Security on the Peninsula.” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 13 (1): 73–99. https://doi.org/10.18588/202505.00a548.
[93]Ibid.
[94] Cha, Victor D. 2024. “Breaking Bad: South Korea’s Nuclear Option.” Report of the CSIS Korea Program, April 29. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/breaking-bad-south-koreas-nuclear-option (accessed April 11, 2025).
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