Confucian Values in North Korean State Ideology

(Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Introduction

North Korean political ideology could be seen as a blend of various political and philosophical schools, including communism, nationalism, and, to some extent, Confucianism. While Confucianism was criticized as a feudal ideology, its notions of loyalty toward a monarch and filial piety became incorporated into the regime’s ideological toolkit. Both the roles of a monarch and a parent were fused in one person, as Kim Il Sung was portrayed not only as a political leader but also as the father of the nation. A slogan of serving people like heaven created during his rule could be seen as a reinterpretation of Mencius' ideas of benevolent governance.

Similar ideas existed in other Asian communist states, whose cultures have been profoundly affected by Confucianism. For example, Ho Chi Minh claimed that the leader’s and the party’s actions should follow the people’s will, while Mao Zedong urged officials to engage directly in the lives of citizens and provide them assistance. Xi Jinping has also been promoting people-centered development to improve citizens’ living conditions.

In modern North Korea, Kim Jong Un has been implementing the people-first policy that bears many similarities with the ideology of his predecessors and other Asian communist leaders. While no mention of Confucianism appeared in official discourse, its ideological core is seemingly heavily influenced by aspects of Confucian thought.

The Confucian concept of benevolent governance

Confucianism gained prominence in Korea in the 14^th century, as scholars began to draw on its principles of virtuous governance and moderation to criticize the corrupt Buddhist elite of the Koryo dynasty. Neo-Confucianism was introduced in Korea through the works of Jeong Dojeon and Gwon Geun, which highlighted its application to governance.[i]

Confucianism dismissed the idea of an independent, autonomous person, claiming that one’s true value lies in relationships with others. The whole society is viewed as a family, with a leader as a caring parent whose key function is to provide for the people's needs.[ii] The leader’s rule is legitimate under the mandate of Heaven, which can be withdrawn and transferred to others if the leader’s rule lacks care for the people. Confucian governance is based on moral principles, with the core elements of benevolence (ren) and justice (yi).[iii] Justice manifests in securing a decent standard of living for the people, while benevolence urges a leader to show mercy and protect the population.[iv] It consists of respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, quickness, and generosity.[v]

A leader is supposed to extend benevolence, which he naturally has for his family, to the whole society and be attentive to the suffering of others.[vi] In practice, this trait is often reduced to mere pity, rather than respect for another person. While a leader is supposed to take care of the nation as if it were his own children, this does not necessarily entail acknowledging their agency and independence.[vii]

Confucian values, especially benevolence, influenced how some Asian governments justified their legitimacy. For instance, in Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnam, principles like minben (people-centered governance) and the government’s duty to ensure happiness were foundational. Good governance was seen as the result of bureaucrats’ moral integrity rather than institutional design.[viii] In Singapore, the People’s Action Party framed its rule as a modern Confucian state, emphasizing paternalism and scholar-officials’ governance.[ix] In China, the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy relies on economic growth and providing basic well-being, even if citizens do not have direct control over the government.[x] In Hong Kong, despite public opposition to paternalism, polls from 1987-1997 indicated that people still expected the government to care for them like family, sharing their joys and sorrows.[xi] Governments' use of Confucian principles varies based on their political systems: democratic nations like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan emphasize harmony and collectivism to reinforce democratic values. In contrast, authoritarian regimes rely on elite paternalism to legitimize their rule.[xii] North Korea exemplifies this approach, portraying its leadership as benevolent and paternalistic to maintain legitimacy.

Adaptation of Confucian values in North Korean politics

North Korea’s stance on the Confucian legacy is unclear: although it has been officially criticized, certain elements have effectively become part of the state ideology. Following liberation in 1945, the new authorities dismissed Confucianism as outdated and hindering the progress of the state. Kim Il Sung’s biography notes his father attended a school where modern subjects were taught, as he saw no point in studying Chinese classics.[xiii] As the North Korean government was established, Confucian academies known as sowon were closed, their property was seized, and the land was nationalized. At the same time, some of them were officially recognized and protected as cultural heritage, presented as Kim Il Sung’s initiative and aimed at portraying him as a leader who cares about the nation’s history and culture.[xiv]

Confucian ideas in North Korea have been fused with nationalism and socialism, providing a basis for the ideology of Juche. In a famous speech, “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche in ideological work”, Kim Il Sung referred to Korean silhak scholars Chong Da San and Pak Yon Am, who criticized Chosun Confucian scholars for their dogmatism and argued that truly virtuous scholars should first and foremost take care of the well-being of their nation.[xv] The state’s attitude towards silhak has changed depending on current priorities: while in the late 1960s it was again criticized for negatively affecting ideological education, in the mid-1980s it received greater attention for its practical value, as the state was encouraging the development of science and technology.

The influence of Confucianism is also visible in North Korea's social and political structure. Unlike Marxism, which called for the abolition of the family, North Korea's 1972 Constitution acknowledged the family as the primary social unit and aimed to incorporate it into the state.[xvi] The Confucian legacy influenced the way society was separated by songbun system according to the role of one’s ancestors' role in the revolution and loyalty to the regime, rather than their function in production and the economy.

The head of state is presented as the center of the nation. Kim Il Sung became not only an intellectual and political leader but also an object of the nation’s emotional energy by positioning himself as the nation’s father, reflecting the paternalistic aspect of Confucianism. His parental image first emerged in the 1950s and was cultivated and reinforced in subsequent decades, ultimately inherited by Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. The leader’s image combines traits of both father and mother, treating the nation as if it were his own child.

Initially, Kim Il Sung was referred to as the father of war orphans in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the term “Fatherly Great Leader” (eobeoi suryeong) appearing in Rodong Sinmun for the first time on Kim Il Sung’s birthday on April 15, 1962.[xvii] The leader was soon presented as a father figure to all North Korean children and youth, eventually encompassing all Koreans, as references to him as “Father of the Whole Nation” (jeon inminui abeoji) began appearing in 1967.[xviii] In the early 1990s, Kim Jong Il further developed a theoretical foundation for the view of the leader as a parental figure, introducing the Confucian notions of loyalty to the leader (chungseong) and filial piety (hyoseong). According to that perspective, paying respect to the head of state was equivalent to honoring one’s father.[xix] At the same time, the leader's fatherly image diverged from the traditional Confucian ideal, as Kim Il Sung was frequently portrayed as caring, cheerful, and occasionally somewhat naïve, rather than strict and moralizing.[xx]

Image of Kim Jong Un as a Benevolent Leader

Similar to the Kim Il Sung era, signs of Confucianism are evident in both Kim Jong Un’s personal image and the government's current people-first policy. Kim Jong Un is depicted as a compassionate leader who prioritizes the country's well-being above his own interests and concerns, and who shares in his people's joys and sorrows. A North Korean collection of stories about Kim Jong Un recounts an episode from his life immediately after Kim Jong Il’s death in winter 2011-2012. According to that story, Kim Jong Un, despite his grief, remained focused on his people and ordered that visitors to outdoor mourning sites be provided with meals and warm clothes. The leader ensured that medical treatment was provided to those whose physical and mental health was affected.[xxi]

Kim Jong Un is presented not only as a responsible and active politician who provides on-the-spot guidance and offers advice on various issues, but also as an empathetic person. For instance, in 2014, he personally visited those injured in a building collapse in Pyongyang, and officials publicly issued apologies for the incident.[xxii] Several years later, the media again reported and published photos of Kim Jong Un visiting injured passengers who were hospitalized after a tourist bus crashed in North Hwanghae province.[xxiii] Another example of Kim’s portrayal as an engaged leader was his visit to the flooded areas of Sinuiju in 2024, where several thousand households were affected by heavy rain. The media showed Kim taking a boat to inspect the damage[xxiv] and showed him navigating a car half-submerged in water.[xxv] That was aimed at strengthening the leader’s prestige amid the domestic problems the population was facing and to convince citizens that the leadership is actively involved in problem-solving.

Showing Kim Jong Un as a leader who genuinely cares about others’ suffering, the media shared footage of him participating in a ceremony honoring soldiers who were sent to Russia in 2024-2025 to fight in the Kursk region.[xxvi] After awarding medals posthumously to fallen soldiers, Kim embraced those who returned, offering reassuring pats or stroking their heads, much like a loving parent comforts a child. A few months after the ceremony, Kim attended the opening of the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations in Pyongyang, where he again met with the soldiers.[xxvii] In the media footage, Kim was hugging them and inspecting the prosthetics of those who had lost limbs in battle. The entire event highlighted the emotional connection between the nation, eager to fight for the honor of their leader and country, and Kim Jong Un, committed to caring for every citizen as a truly benevolent leader.

Unlike the infallible images of his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un is portrayed as someone who can admit his mistakes and apologize. During the military parade celebrating the WPK’s anniversary in 2020, he admitted he had failed to meet citizens' expectations and expressed regret, his eyes swelling with tears.[xxviii] Such public apologies serve not only as a formal admittance of one’s wrongdoing but also demonstrate one’s sincerity and respect toward a victim. Therefore, the 2020 apology aimed to highlight Kim’s benevolence and his desire to restore and maintain public trust.

Confucian Roots of People-First Policy

Since coming to power, Kim Jong Un has been promoting the so-called people-first policy. While it is officially claimed that the people-first policy is the core of Kimilsungism-Kimjungilism, its main idea is very similar to Mencius’ teaching of benevolent governance and, to a lesser extent, Xunzi’s strict governance. Mencius believed in the inherently good nature of people and claimed that they are the foundation of a state; therefore, taking care of people is the leader's utmost priority. This concept is clearly reflected in the North Korean principle of treating people like heaven (iminwicheon), introduced during Kim Il Sung’s rule.

Unlike Mencius, Xunzi claimed that human nature is evil and the social order could be maintained only through strong institutions and regulations. That resonated with the view of WPK as a driving and organizing force of the people. One excerpt from the Minju Joson, the second largest newspaper after Rodong Sinmun, claims the following: “People-first policy is a philosophy and the spirit of the revolution, which treats people like heaven and prioritizes them. According to this policy, people are the greatest, wisest, and most precious power in the world, which should be respected. <…> No matter how great the power of the people is, it would not manifest itself. It becomes possible only when people are ideologically and institutionally united.”[xxix]

The image of the party as a caring mother, with members serving as active supporters of the people, was established several decades ago. While the party's role weakened compared to the military during Kim Jong Il’s songun policy, Kim Jong Un has once again solidified the party’s control. The 8th Congress of the WPK marked the final consolidation of the party’s power and the shift from songun to a people-first policy. The party, its leader, and the people are depicted as parts of a single body that cannot function properly without each other. Their relationship is reciprocal yet hierarchical, forming the foundation of the state’s stability. In this regard, Confucius also argued that a country could survive without a strong army and enough food, but cannot last without people’s trust in their leader.

The state encourages initiative and selflessness among its officials, while criticizing self-interest and corruption. As the state promotes the image of party members as caring people, even minor initiatives and the provision of necessities are sometimes presented as signs of the party’s devotion to the nation. For example, North Korean media reported that local officials were caring for citizens by providing clean drinking water and warm clothing. Healthcare measures and shutting the borders during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic that allowed North Korea to minimize the risk of the disease spreading were also attributed to Kim Jong Un’s wise leadership. In other words, state actions that are seen as basic obligations elsewhere are framed as gestures of goodwill and voluntary care from the leadership.

The people-first policy has become a core ideological principle guiding the development of housing, factories, and social facilities nationwide. Efforts to bolster the regime’s legitimacy by enhancing living standards mirror China’s strategy. The construction of new infrastructure is presented as a gift to the people and underscores the leadership's practical steps to improve the well-being of North Korean citizens. The media reported that Kim made 349 visits to economic sites, compared with 241 to military locations in 2012-2019.[xxx] Most efforts were initially concentrated on projects in Pyongyang, where several new streets were built since 2012: Changjeon Street, Unha Scientists Street, Mirae Street, and Ryomyong Street. While Pyongyang remained the most affluent area of the country, the overall level of urbanization remained modest, and other regions remained underdeveloped. To improve living conditions and increase regional consumption, the government has launched the “20×10 policy” for regional development, aiming to build factories and social facilities over the next 10 years. As Kim Jong Un visits various regions to inspect the facilities, the policy helps boost his image among the local residents.

Conclusion

Although North Korea dismisses Confucianism as an outdated ideology, it still draws on some of its principles, particularly the idea that the leader, the party, and the nation are one, to strengthen loyalty among its citizens. The Kims have historically created an emotional bond between a caring, compassionate leader and a grateful nation to legitimize their rule. Today, Kim Jong Un continues this approach, anchoring his legitimacy in acts of benevolence and initiatives to enhance the people's material quality of life.

The government can effectively leverage Confucianism as a political tool, as it remains deeply rooted in Korean culture despite challenges to interpersonal hierarchies, exemplified by the Jangmadan generation and the growing influence of women. This cultural legacy supports legitimacy based on performance, which is easy to sustain in North Korea because of the country’s low economic starting point. Even without major economic reforms, the government can craft a benevolent image through targeted, highly publicized initiatives, such as the construction of apartments or factories.

[i] Kalton, M.C. (2019). Neo-Confucian Thought. In Ro, Y. (Ed.), Dao Companion to Korean Confucian Philosophy, pp. 17-46.

[ii] Nosco, P. (2008). Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government. In Bell, D. (Ed.), Confucian Political Ethics, pp. 20-45.

[iii] Qiyong, G. U. O. (2013). On Confucian political philosophy and its theory of justice. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 8(1), pp. 53-75.

[iv] Dobson, W.A.C.H. (1966). Mencius. A new translation arranged and annotated for the general reader. University of Toronto Press. 215 pp.

[v] Luo, S. (2012). Confucius's Virtue Politics: Ren as Leadership Virtue. Asian Philosophy, 22(1) pp. 15-35.

[vi] Kim, S. (2012). Virtue Politics and Political Leadership: A Confucian Rejoinder to Hanfeizi. Asian Philosophy, 22(2), pp. 177-197.

[vii] Zhang, Q. (2016). Humanity or benevolence? The interpretation of Confucian Ren and its modern implications. In Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism, pp. 45-99.

[viii] Ali, F. (2021). The Origins of Contemporary Moral Education and Political Ideology in Confucian-Marxist Hồ Chí Minh’s Vietnam. Asian Studies, 8(2), pp. 115-134.

[ix] Tan, K. P., & Wong, B. (2016). The evolution of political legitimacy in Singapore: Electoral institutions, governmental performance, moral authority, and meritocracy. In Chan, J., Sin, T. C., & Williams, M. S. (Eds.), East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy: Bridging the empirical-normative divide, pp. 135-165.

[x] Bell, D.A. (2023). Political Legitimacy in China: A Confucian Approach. In Chan, J., Sin, T. C., & Williams, M. S. (Eds.), East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy: Bridging the empirical-normative divide, pp. 78-106.

[xi] Lam, W. (2023). Political Legitimacy in Hong Kong: A Hybrid Notion. In Chan, J., Sin, T. C., & Williams, M. S. (Eds.), East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy: Bridging the empirical-normative divide, pp. 107-134.

[xii] Huang, M. (2024). Confucian Culture and Democratic Values: An Empirical Comparative Study in East Asia. Journal of East Asian Studies, 24, pp. 71-101.

[xiii] Levi, N. (2023). Chosen Aspects of Intangible and Tangible Legacies of Confucianism in North Korea. Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej, 23, p. 120.

[xiv] Glomb, V., Lee, E. (2017). Dens of Feudalism: North Korean Discourse on Confucian Academies. Journal of Korean Religions, 8(2), pp. 147-180.

[xv] David-West, A. (2011). Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the Case of Chŏng Tasan. Korean Studies, 35. pp. 93-121.

[xvi] Levi, N. (2015). Correlations between the contemporary ideology of the North Korean and chosen Confucianism values. Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, 12(3),P. 123.

[xvii] 이창현. (2023). 북한 ‘어버이수령’의 탄생 1972년 이전 북한 공식문헌에서의 출현을 중심으로 [Kim Jong-un's establishment of “Father of the people” and its characteristics: Focusing on the analysis of Rodong Sinmun]. 통일연구 [Unification Studies], 2(1), pp. 119-166.

[xviii]Ibid.

[xix] Kang, J. (2011). Political Uses of Confucianism in North Korea. Journal of Korean Studies, 16(1) pp. 63-87.

[xx] Myers, B. R. (2011). The cleanest race: how North Koreans see themselves and why it matters. Melville House.

[xxi] Thak, S. (Ed.). (2018). Son of the People. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Pp. 10-17.

[xxii] N. Korean leader visits hospital after deadly apartment collapse. Yonhap News Agency. May 19, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140519002700315

[xxiii] Kim Jong-un’s ‘bitter sorrow’ as bus crash kills Chinese tourists. BBC. April 24, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43875526

[xxiv] Lee, K. Kim Jong-un inspects devastating flood damage in North Korea. The Chosun Daily. August 1, 2024. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/08/01/Z7JPGIHTIBFKFOK53KEBEQNS2I/

[xxv] Williams, M. Floods cut access to Uiju Import Quarantine Center. 38 North. July 31, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2024/07/floods-cut-access-to-uiju-import-quarantine-center/

[xxvi] Kim Jong-un decorates soldiers who fought for Russia. South China Morning Post (YouTube channel). 22.08.2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUTSrx2en7o

[xxvii]해외군사작전 전투위훈기념관건설착공식 숭엄히 거행 Groundbreaking Ceremony for Building  Memorial Museum of Combat Feats. 메아리 (YouTube channel). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V36gYQZTnT0#:~:text=Memorial%20Museum%20of%20Combat%20Feats%20at%20Overseas,Respected%20Comrade%20Kim%20Jong%20Un%20Attends%20Groundbreaking

[xxviii] McCurry, J. Kim Jong-un sheds tears as he delivers rare apology to North Korea over failings. The Guardian. October 12, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/12/kim-jong-un-sheds-tears-as-he-delivers-rare-apology-to-north-korea-over-failings

[xxix] 김일성-김정일주의는 본질에 있어 인민대중제일주의 [Kimilsungism – Kimjungilism has the People-First Politics at Its Core. ]. 민주조선 [Minju Choseon]. 13.04.2015. 쪽 2.

[xxx] Jung, S. (2024). Kim Jung Un’s Populism: The People-First Principle in North Korean Foreign Policy. The Correlation Between North Korea’s Economic and Foreign Policy. Kim Y. (Ed.) NKEF Policy and Research Paper Series 2024. The George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies, p. 12.